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Abstract 
This paper investigates whether a country’s level of income matters to the effectiveness of institutions 
in fostering economic growth. The institutional variables are represented by democracy, corruption 
levels, and armed conflicts. The countries in the data-set are divided into high-, middle- and low-income 
countries based on the World Bank criteria. The overall results indicate that institutional variables 
have offsetting effects on economic growth. The performance of these variables appears to have been 
influenced by the countries’ level of income. Labour, capital and human capital are found to be positive 
and significant variables for economic growth, irrespective of whether the countries are in high-, 
middle- and low-income groups. On the contrary, corruption affects GDP negatively in high- and 
middle-income groups, but positive, although insignificant in low-income countries. Democracy has a 
mixed effect on economic growth and largely negative in high- and low-income countries, but positive 
in middle-income group. Armed conflicts do not appear to have any statistically significant effect on 
high and middle-income countries’ economic growth.  However, it has a significant negative effect on 
low-income countries’ economic growth. 
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1. Introduction 
Identifying sources of economic growth and the factors that could hinder it has been at the 
forefront of academic research with relevant policy implication. Initial work in the area is based 
on the neo-classical theory, which can be regarded as supply-oriented (Federici and Marconi, 
2002). However, these models did not explicitly recognise the role of domestic policies, 
including trade policies to growth. The work of Kaldor (1970) introduced the role of 
international trade, particularly foreign-demand in fostering and sustaining economic growth 
to the literature. This sub-literature became known as the demand-oriented theory. The new 
growth theory also known as the endogenous growth models that largely based on the work of 
Romer (1986) and Lucas (1988) recognised the determinant role played by skills augmented 
efficiency, completion and capital flows to economic growth. Coe and Helpman (1995), Arrow 
(1962) Uzawa (1965) and Solow (1969) have all contributed towards the development of the 
theory. 
Recent Literature (see among others Berg, et al., 2012; Hausmann et al., 2006; Easterly et al., 
2006) has identified important role played by institutional factors to growth, which have been 
largely overlooked by both the neo-classical and the endogenous growth theories. Empirical 
literature has also confirm importance of such variables to a countries growth, which include 
political variables like democracy, government stability, economic freedom, violence, frequent 
armed conflicts and level of corruption. A survey of this literature has been provided by 
Brunneti (1997). However, what is not clear is whether level of income of a country is a factor 
in the importance of these sunspots variables. 
This paper has two objectives. First, it aims at bringing in further empirical evidence 
concerning the role of these variables in economic growth with a particular emphasis on the 
role of ‘polity’ score, existence of armed conflicts, and level of corruption, using both cross-
sectional and panel data for 126 and 106 countries, respectively. Secondly, the paper 
investigates whether the effects of these variables vary according to the income level of a 
country. To this end, the countries in the sample are grouped into low-, middle- and high-
income countries, using the World Bank classification scheme.   
This study therefore examines two sets of variables – the traditional and institutional variables 
- in a growth model. Literature suggests that although there is a consensus about the positive 
effect of traditional variables such as labour and capital, on economic growth, however, the 
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influence of institutional variables are controversial. Existing studies apply either democracy 
or corruption or armed conflict in the growth regression. This is the first study (to the best of 
our knowledge) which applies these variables in the growth regression. This study will also 
assist in reducing the controversy about the ambiguous effect of institutional variables on 
economic growth.                          
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 provides a brief review of the relevant 
literature on the importance of corruption, polity and conflict on economic growth. Section 3 
discusses the theoretical framework and presents the empirical model used for the analysis as 
well as the data-set. Section 4 presents the empirical results while Section 5 concludes. 
2. Brief Overview of the Relevant Literature 
The modern-day world has come off a long way from the organic view of the state in which 
the existence of the citizens and their activities would exclusively mean for the welfare of the 
‘state’ rather than the citizens themselves. The role of the government has thus shifted from 
maintenance of law and order, and governance to enhancing the standards of living of the 
citizens. This is, probably more true in democratic societies where leadership is conferred with 
mandates by the citizens than in other political systems. The perceived new role of the 
government apparently makes it to be performance-oriented. The achievement of these 
governments is contingent upon the presence or absence of certain parameters. The set of 
parameters include, among other things, governance, political violence, political volatility, 
corruption, and armed conflicts. In emphasising the role of the institutional variables, the 
contemporary growth literature brings to the forefront the institutional view on economic 
growth. The role of institutions in economic development was first identified by Lewis (1955). 
Later literature considers institutions as potential sources of differences in cross-country 
differences in growth (see, for example, North and Thomas (1973); Acemoglu et al. (2005); 
IMF (2005)). Rodik (2005) develops a four-cluster taxonomy of institutions that is vital to the 
study of economic growth. The taxonomy includes (a) market-creating institution that ensures 
the security of the property rights and enforcement of contracts; (b) marketing-regulating 
institution responsible for command and control; (c) market-stabilizing institution chocking 
out fiscal and monetary policies; and (d) market-legitimising institutions that refer to the 
political regime that oversees the operation of the market. Thus, a clear synergy between 
economic institutions as embedded in the neoclassical theory, political institutions, and 
political regimes is now discernible. 
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The literature on economic institution-growth nexus is still evolving. The literature in this area 
largely draws from the development of economic institutions in many European colonies in the 
past 500 years. These included the provision for private property, introduction and/or 
maintenance of extractive institutions, migration of the Europeans to sparsely populated 
regions, introduction of legal rights and the quality thereof in protecting the investors, among 
other issues. Empirical evidence, though not free from controversy, is indicative of a positive 
impact of economic institutions on economic growth. Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2001, 
2002) find positive effects of the development of private property and the introduction of 
extractive institutions in previously poor regions. Acemoglu (2001) finds that settlements of 
Europeans, as proxied by mortality rates 100 years ago, have no effect on per capita GDP today. 
However, mortality rates are likely to have contributed to the development of institutions that 
may affect growth. La Porta et al. (1997, 1998) show that the degree of investor protection as 
spelled out in the legal systems has implications for the development of equity and stock 
markets. Better investor protection leads to greater debt and equity markets and also to better 
labour-market conditions which in turn may contribute to growth (Botero et al., 2004; 
Mahoney, 2001). Deger, Lam and Sen (2011) find positive relationship between growth and 
economic institutions.  
The theoretical underpinnings of the role of institutional variables3 to economic growth have 
been brought to light by Cass and Shell (1981, 1983). Cass and Shell (1983) argue that while 
institutions do not matter in the static Arrow-Debru economy with complete markets, it may 
matter in overlapping-generations models under certain conditions. Further, in the presence of 
institutions, equilibrium allocations are Pareto optimal in a ‘weaker’ sense’, “which is 
appropriate to dynamic analysis”. Bruneti (1997) has an extensive survey of the empirical 
literature concerning the effects of the sunspot variables on economic growth. The survey 
reviewed five categories of papers respectively concentrating on democracy, political 
volatility, government stability, political violence, and subjective political measures. Measures 
of political volatility and subjective political indicators have been found to have significant 
effects of economic growth followed by government stability and political violence. Other 
literature examines and re-examined the impact of traditional determinants such as economic 
endowment, labour force, physical capital and human capital of economic growth. There is 
hardly any debate about the direct and positive impact of these variables on economic growth. 
                                                          
3 They are also alternatively known as “animal spirits” or “market psychology”. 
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The focus of this study is therefore not the traditional determinants rather institutional factors 
of economic growth.    
Democracy appears to have mixed results, and in most cases being unsuccessful in explaining 
economic growth. Fidrmuc (2003) suggests that democracy strengthens economic 
liberalization and effectively contributes towards growth. De Hann and Sturm (2003) find that 
democracy leads to greater economic freedom, which is an important ingredient in fostering 
economic growth of developing countries. Tavares and Wacziarg (2001) find that the net effect 
of democracy on growth is moderately negative. Barro (1996) and Helliwell (1994) also 
indicate an insignificant effect of democracy on the economic growth. Chan (2002), Dornbusch 
and Edwards (1991), Kohli (2004), and Leftwich (2005) document that democratic government 
finds it difficult to initiate painful economic reforms, which may have adversely affect the 
welfare of the people, even in the short-run. Deger, Lam and Sen (2011) find that political 
institutions including democracy do not have any conclusive effects on economic growth. A 
separate line of research on the association between democracy and economic growth 
conjectures that democracies and autocracies achieve, on average, equal economic growth, 
though democracies are less volatile (Doucouliago and Ulubasoglu, 2006; Mulligan, Giland 
Sala-i-Martin, 2004). Polity (a measure of democracy), in this study, is therefore included as 
one of the institutional determinants of economic growth to re-examine the impact of it on 
economic growth. Similarly corruption has been found to have adverse effects on the economic 
growth (Gyimah-Brempong, 2002; Keefer and Knack, 1997; Knack and Keefer, 1995; Li et 
al., 2000; Mauro, 1995; Mo, 2001; Sachs and Warner, 1997). Ades and Di (1997), Mauro 
(1995), and Meon and Sekkat (2005) find that the association between corruption and economic 
growth to be constantly negative and more dominant in countries with allegedly high levels of 
red tape, weak legal system and extensive government inefficiencies. Mauro (1995) also states 
that corruption decreases the quantity of private investments, which ultimately adversely 
affects the growth. Tanzi and Davoodi (1997), Ehrlich and Lui (1999), Sarte (2000), Aidt et. 
al (2007), Blackburna and Forgues-Puccio (2010), and Park (2012) also document negative 
effect of corruption on economic growth. Unlike democracy, the negative impact of corruption 
on economic growth is less controversial. This study investigates the effect of corruption using 
both cross-sectional and panel data which is missing in existing studies. A large number of 
studies have investigated the empirical relationship between conflict (which is our third 
institutional variable for economic growth) and growth. Barro and Lee (1994) examine the 
factors affecting economic growth from 1965 to 1985 in a large cross-section of countries and 
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find insignificant relationship between war and economic growth. Murdoch and Sandler (2002) 
find that civil war has an inverse relationship with short-term economic growth but does not 
impact long-term economic growth. Koubi (2005) finds that war severity and duration seems 
to contribute positively to subsequent economic growth, although war may have a negative and 
contemporary effect on economic growth in the short-run due to devastation of productive 
resources. Daria (2009) finds no direct association between war and economic growth. It can 
be concluded that there is little consensus about any specific effect of armed conflict on 
economic growth. Overall, it seems that although armed conflict negatively effects economic 
growth in the short-run, the long-run implication of armed conflict is ambiguous.  
3.1 The Theoretical Framework, the Empirical Model and the Data 
The theoretical framework is based on a two-factor Cobb-Douglas production function that 
encompasses two basic factors of production, labour and capital, which positively affect economic 
growth with probably different size of contribution, represented by α and 𝛽 respectively. There are also 
institutional and infrastructural factors, which can be very influential determining factors to output 
growth. These factors can be denoted by 𝐴, represents the initial endowments of a country and therefore, 
capturing the differences in productivity across countries. Besides, the literature also suggests a ‘state 
capacity’ variable in the growth equation, which also can be captured by 𝐴. Several papers have found 
that human capital is also an important determinant of economic growth (see, for example, Mankiw, 
Romer and Weil, 1992; Mankiw, Phelps and Romer, 1995). Putting all these together provides 
traditional variables of the initial endowment (A), labour (L), physical capital (K) and human capital 
(H). As representatives of the traditional variables, the present study includes level of non-corruption, 
existence of armed conflicts, and level of democracy into the model. Accordingly, the model can be 
represented as: 
𝑌 = 𝐴𝐿𝛼𝐾𝛽𝐻1−𝛼−𝛽𝐸𝛿  ;     𝛼 > 0, 𝛽 > 0,    𝛿 ⋚ 0.                                                        (1) 
This indicates that labour, physical capital and human capital positively contribute to 
production while the combination of the institutional variables as outlined here may have an 
offsetting effect, positive effect or insignificant influence on economic growth. The model 
specified in equation (1) can be re-written in logs as:  
 
 𝑙𝑛𝑌𝑖𝑡 = 𝜇𝑖 + ln(𝐴)𝑖 + 𝛼𝑙𝑛𝐿𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽𝑙𝑛𝐾𝑖𝑡 + (1 − 𝛼 − 𝛽)𝑙𝑛𝐻𝑖𝑡 + 𝛿𝑙𝑛𝐸𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡                      (2) 
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where, 𝑌 is output of country 𝑖 at time 𝑡; 𝜇 is the country-specific effect;  𝐴 is initial endowment 
of the country 𝑖; 𝐸 is the vector of institutional variables as defined above and 𝜀 is an error 
term.   
Based on equation (2) above, the empirical model is given as follows: 
𝑙𝑛𝑌𝑖,𝑡 = 𝜇𝑖 + 𝛽1𝑙𝑛𝑌𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽2𝑙𝑛𝐿𝐹𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑙𝑛𝐾𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑙𝑛𝐻𝐾𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽5𝑙𝑛𝑃𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽6𝑙𝑛𝑁𝑃𝐼𝑖,𝑡 +
𝛽7𝐶𝐷𝑈𝑀 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡                (3) 
where 𝛽1 > 0; 𝛽2 > 0; 𝛽3 > 0; 𝛽4 > 0; 𝛽5 ⋚ 0; 𝛽6 < 0; 𝛽7 ≦ 0. 𝑌𝑖𝑡 denotes PPP-adjusted 
GDP (constant 2005 international $) for each country 𝑖 over the period from 2000 to 20094. 𝐿 
represents labour force, 𝐾 is gross fixed capital formation as percentage of GDP, 𝐻𝐾 is the 
country’s human capital and proxied by the percentage of population completed secondary 
education aged 25 and over. 𝑃 is the polity score, 𝑁𝑃𝐼 is non-corruption perception index, 
C_Dum is the armed conflict dummy, which takes the value of 1 if there is an incidence of 
conflict and 0 otherwise while 𝜀 is an error term. The cross-sectional model uses the mean 
values for the covered period (2000-2009) of all the variables. All the variables except armed 
conflict dummy are the average (2000-2009) of their respective values over cross-section. Non-
corruption perception index (NPI) data are available from 1995 for few countries, but it is 
available for most countries from 2000. Since NPI is one of the most important variables for 
this study, and it is only available for the sample countries from 2000 onwards, therefore, our 
analysis is limited to ten years, 2000 – 2009 due to limitation of data.   
The economic growth equation was estimated using both cross-sectional and panel data. Cross-
sectional data is used for 126 countries, while balanced panel data are obtained for 106 
countries. Time series data cover from 2000 to 2009 period. Some countries whose variables, 
such as GDP, labour force, capital, corruption and armed conflict are available, but are 
excluded from this study as they do not have human capital and polity variables. Extending the 
time series may require dropping out many countries. It is worth noting that the number of 
countries included in the panel analysis is smaller than that of the cross-sectional study. This 
is because countries without all variables have been excluded in the panel analysis. Data on 
PPP-adjusted GDP and PPP-adjusted GDP per capita, labour force, and gross fixed capital 
formation (% GDP) variables are sourced from the ‘World Bank Development Indicators’ 
                                                          
4 An alternative model used PPP-adjusted GDP (constant 2005 international $) per capita. 
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(WDI). Human capital variables are sourced from Barro and Lee Database (2010). Democracy 
level (polity), non-corruptions and armed conflicts are compiled from the Centre for Systemic 
Peace and the Centre for Global Policy, George Mason University (April 30, 2010); Uppsala 
Conflict Data Program (1 August 2011); and Corruption Perceptions Index (various issues) of 
the Transparency International.  
Both the cross-sectional regression and the panel study techniques are use for estimation. We 
have tested the sensitivity of data and empirical model by using sub-group analysis. Full 
sample, high-income, middle-income and low-income countries data are applied in both cross-
sectional as well as panel study. Additionally, non-oil sub-sample is used in the cross-section 
analysis. We apply PPP-adjusted GDP and PPP-adjusted GDP per capita in alternative 
regressions. The panel study applied OLS as well as fixed effects models in full-sample and 
sub-samples.    
3.2 The Variables 
i) Polity 
The original ‘polity’ variable from the dataset consists of scores which take values between -
10 (strongly autocratic) and +10 (strongly democratic).  However, these were converted into a 
range that runs from 0 to 20 in order to facilitate the conversion of the variables into their 
natural logs required for the analysis. The modified ‘polity’ variable, labelled ‘polity2’ is used.  
The advantage of using ‘polity2’ is that it has standardized the original scores and yielded 
positive figures that are required for log conversion.   
<Figure 1> 
Figure 1 plots the average polity distribution for 126 countries in the world.5 The world average 
is 14. There is very low polity score for the socialist countries (such as China) and kingdoms 
(such as Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, UAE, Qatar, and Bahrain) despite the fact that they have been 
growing faster than many democratic countries. Bhutan (-10), Qatar (-10) and Saudi Arabia (-
10), Turkmenistan (-9), Uzbekistan (-9), Swaziland (-9), UAE (-8), China (-7), Vietnam (-7), 
                                                          
5 Some names are omitted from the figure to avoid clumsiness in appearance.   
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Laos (-7) carry very low polity score. However, average growth of Bhutan (8.5%), Qatar 
(12.5%), Saudi Arabia (3.4%), Turkmenistan (14.2%), Uzbekistan (6.5%), Swaziland (3.1%), 
UAE (5.8%), China (10.3%), Vietnam (7.3%), Laos (6.8%) indicate that less polity score does 
not negatively affect economic growth. In reality, the average growth rate of these countries 
(7.8%) was way higher than world average growth rate (4.5%). Perhaps, the stability of 
economy, not necessarily the level of polity, plays significant role in economic growth. 
Nonetheless, we have excluded countries with polity score of 0 as conversion into the logarithm 
generates no value. 
ii) Corruption  
Corruption is, generally, perceived as detrimental to growth. This is supported by empirical 
findings of, among others, Mauro (1995), Brnetti and Weder (1998) and Mo (2001) who 
reported negative effects of corruption on growth as it discourages investment. However, 
Bardham (1997) Beck and Mahar (1986) and Lien (1986) counter argue that corruption, 
particularly, bribery could be beneficial to growth as it can “grease the wheels” of an inefficient 
bureaucracy. Development of businesses that were aided by corruption are cited as examples 
to buttress the point6. Corruption Perceptions Index, CPI as defined by the Transparency 
International (TI) 7 is “poll of polls” that show the average scores which are the reflection of 
opinions by international businesses people and financial journalists for all the countries in the 
world. Countries are ranked according to the perceptions of corruption level in the public 
sector. Thus it is an indicator of corruption level at as perceived by businesses and how it affects 
their commercial activities. The higher the score of NPI, the lower the level of perceived 
corruption by businesses for a country. The corruption indicator is denoted by Non-corruption 
Perception Index (NPI). Consequently, if corruption deters economic growth, we expect a 
positive sign for the coefficient of NPI variable. The NPI scores for full sample are plotted 
against GDP and GDP per capita in Figure 2a and 2b, respectively.  
<Figure 2> 
The world average of non-corruption score is found to be approximately 4, which is below half 
of the total score. Scandinavian countries are the top scorers as least corrupt countries while 
                                                          
6 This is consistent with argument of Leff (1964), Huntinton (1968) and Leys 1965), which was later come to be 
known as “grease the wheels” hypothesis. 
7The Berlin-based anti-corruption non-governmental organisation, TI, defines corruption as “the abasement of 
entrusted power for private gain”. 
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South Asia and Africa have the lowest scores as the most corrupt countries. The trend line gives 
an indication of positive relationship between non-corruption and GDP. 
iii) Armed Conflict 
The UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset Codebook defines the term ‘conflict’ has been 
defined as: “a contested incompatibility that concerns government and/or territory where the 
use of armed force between two parties, of which at least one is the government of a state, 
results in at least 25 battle-related deaths”. Average annual numbers of battle deaths due to 
both internal and external conflicts are collected and a dummy variable is constructed for the 
armed conflicts. A value of 1 for the dummy denotes the presence of armed conflicts and a 
value of 0 denotes otherwise. It may be mentioned that after the end of the ‘cold war era’ (1947 
to 1991) both internal and external armed conflicts had fallen dramatically. We find 39 
countries (either internally or externally involved with armed conflicts) out of the 126 selected 
countries were involved in armed conflicts at least once between 2000 and 2009. Among them 
Algeria, Burundi, Colombia, Democratic Republic of Congo, India, Israel, Nepal, Pakistan, the 
Philippines, Russia, Sri Lanka, Thailand, Turkey, Uganda and USA were heavily involved in 
conflicts. A distinctive effect of internal to external conflict is beyond the scope of this study. 
A third country which was not directly involved in combat, however, indirectly played a role 
(supported) combating countries in their internal or external conflict is not considered in this 
study. Any further study may find these distinctions interesting.  
<Figure 3> 
Figures 3a and 3b represent GDP and GDP per capita and armed conflicts. It is apparent from 
the figure that GDP per capita is more sensitive to conflict than GDP. It is, therefore, higher 
for a country which is not engaged in armed conflict and vice versa. The triangle shape shows 
the GDP of non-conflicting while star shape shows GDP of conflicting countries. Very few 
countries (except some developed countries such as USA, UK, Russia, Israel, who can be 
considered as world leader), which maintain high GDP per capita are involved in armed 
conflict. The UK and the US were the main players in the war against Iraq8 (30 countries were 
                                                          
8 Countries which were involved in the Iraq invasion are: Albania, Australia, Azerbaijan, Bulgaria, Czech 
Republic, Denmark, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Estonia, Georgia, Honduras, Italy, Kazakhstan, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Macedonia, Moldova, Mongolia, Netherlands, Nicaragua, Norway, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, 
South Korea, Romania, Slovakia, Spain, Tonga, Ukraine, United Kingdom, United States of America. 
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involved in military invasion under the American-led coalition) and (Taleban) Afghanistan9 
(47 countries were involved) who spent a significant amount of money for war. Although many 
countries were physically involved in these wars, however, the war expenditure for many 
countries was very insignificant amount. Subsequently, these two external armed conflicts are 
typically different to others. Also, including all these countries into the analysis as those 
engaged in armed conflict between 2003 and 2008 (which covers almost our entire sample 
period), could lead to some misleading results. The nature of these wars is typically different 
to other internal and external conflicts. Types of expenditure are also different. Many involved 
countries in these wars have not faced any battle deaths except Iraqis, the British and the 
American. Differentiating the conflicts into internal and external is beyond the scope of this 
paper, but it may be an interesting future extension10.  
4. Discussion of the Empirical Results 
Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics, which indicates that the world average of growth rate 
is 4.5 percent with a large discrepancy between countries, which is as high as 15 percent and 
as low as approximately half a percent. Average polity score is about 14 out of 20 in the world. 
China’s average polity score was 3, while its average GDP growth rate was about 10 percent 
during the same period. Qatar’s average polity score was 0 (zero), while the country’s average 
GDP growth rate was 13.5 percent in the last decade. On the contrary, Portugal’s average polity 
was 20 while the country’s average GDP growth rate was less than 1 percent. A similar feature 
(in terms of polity and economic growth) is observed in many other countries. The average 
NPI score for the world as a whole is about 4 out of 10, with the highest NPI score of 9.52 for 
Finland is perceived as the least corrupt country in the world. Denmark (9.46), New Zealand 
(9.45), Singapore (9.28), Sweden (9.24) and Iceland (9.22) are the other perceived less corrupt 
countries. Those with the lowest scores of 1.7 point are Afghanistan and Bangladesh, perceived 
as the most corrupt countries in the world.11 Chad (1.73), Sudan (1.89), Democratic Republic 
                                                          
9 Countries which were involved in war against Taleban (in Afghanistan) are: Albania, Armenia, Australia, 
Austria, Azerbaijan, Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Canada, Croatia, Czech Republic, Denmark, 
Estonia, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Jordan, Latvia, Lithuania, 
Luxembourg, Macedonia (Former Yugoslav Republic of), Malaysia, Mongolia, Montenegro, Netherlands, New 
Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Korea, Spain, Sweden, 
Turkey, Ukraine, United Arab Emirate, United Kingdom, United States of America. 
10 A third country, which is not directly involved in combat, but indirectly paly a supportive role is excluded in 
the analysis. 
11 Somalia and Myanmar have lower NPI scores than Afghanistan and Bangladesh. Somalia, Myanmar and 
Afghanistan however are not included in our panel. Afghanistan and Bangladesh were included in our cross-
section. 
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of Congo (1.94) are perceived as the next most corrupt countries, for the sample period.  
Ethiopia is the worse armed-conflict-hit country in the sample period, which was followed by 
Afghanistan, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Sudan and India. The least hit country was Azerbaijan which 
was followed by Peru, China, Iran and Tajikistan.  
<Table 1> 
The democracy indicator, the polity, as expected, has the highest mean in the high-income 
countries and followed by the middle-income countries. The low-income countries group has 
the least average of polity. However, these are averages and can obscure some individual 
countries’ positions. For example, there are a number of countries that are classified as high-
income countries, but are under autocratic governments. These countries include Qatar, 
Bahrain and the United Arab Emirates. This is evident in the difference between the minimum 
and the maximum. The minimum is 1, which is highly autocratic while the maximum is 20, 
that is, highly democratic. The scenario is similar for middle- and low-income countries, albeit, 
to a lesser degree in the latter.   
This study applies both cross-section and panel techniques. Multicollinearity is not a vital issue 
for cross-section. However, since, panel data includes both time-series and cross-section, 
multicollinearity could be a problem. Correlation between the variables in panel is tested to 
examine any potential multicollinearity problem. Table 2 presents the correlation matrix and it 
indicates that the degree of correlation between the independent variables in the empirical 
model and shows that the correlation is not significantly high. Therefore, multicollinearity is 
not likely to be a problem.  
The model specified in equation (3) is estimated and the results are reported in Tables 3, 5 and 
6. Table 3 presents the results obtained from the cross-sectional estimation by applying mean 
values (2000-2009) of variables, while Tables 5 and 6 report panel study results by applying 
the pooled OLS and the fixed effects estimators, respectively. 
4.1 Mean Cross-Section: 
Real GDP (PPP) per capital and real GDP (PPP) are used as dependent variables in alternative 
estimations. A full-sample (which includes collectively high, medium and low income 
countries, and does not differentiate between oil producing and non-oil producing countries) 
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and sub-samples based on different income level and oil production status are used which give 
us an opportunity to examine the sensitivity of the results. All variables are in real term and in 
logarithm form except armed conflict (which is a binary dummy). Qatar and Saudi Arabia are 
excluded from sample because polity score for them is zero which cannot be converted into 
logarithm. Total sample size in the cross-section and panel are 126 and 106 countries, 
respectively. The reported results from the cross-section show that, in general, the traditional 
variables, which are labour, capital and human capital foster GDP growth. However, the 
institutional determinants of growth that include the polity and the corruption variables are 
found to be negative and significant. A negative sign of the coefficient of the polity variable 
indicates that the greater the degree of democracy, the lower will be the GDP growth.  
<Table 3> 
Corruption is found to be a key player in economic growth. It is worth mentioning that high 
score of NPI indicates suggest less perceived corruption level. A positive sign of NPI (Non-
corruption Perception Index) therefore indicates that more non-corruption leads to more GDP 
growth; hence, more corruption leads to less economic growth. Corruption variable is found to 
be significant in full-sample as well as in each sub-sample, except the low-income countries. 
The size of the NPI coefficient is also very high compare to other variables. In fact, the positive 
effect of traditional variables is fully neutralised by the negative effect of corruption variable 
alone. Consequently, what remains in GDP growth is actually only the autonomous growth. 
Specifically, in full-sample model (for example), the significant traditional variables jointly 
contribute 0.562 to the real GDP per capita and 1.52 to real GDP; however, these contributions 
have been neutralised by corruption alone (1.77 and 1.685, respectively). The coefficient of 
corruption is found statistically greater than one in both GDP per capita and GDP models. This 
finding is consistent with the literature that suggests corruption is “sand in the wheels”. That is 
corruption constitute an obstacle to growth (Mauro, 1995; Brutietti and Weder, 1998; and Mo, 
2001).      
Although the estimated result from cross-section on full sample regression shows that armed 
conflict has a negative and significant effect at 10% significance level on GDP per capita 
growth, however, it does not appear to have any significant effect on GDP growth. This may 
be because armed conflict was not a significant phenomenon in the 2000s. The major conflicts 
which took place in the 2000s were some kind of unusual conflict such as group attacks on a 
particular country (e.g., Iraq, Afghanistan). Iraq is not included in our analysis due to non-
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reliability of data. Although, Afghanistan, USA and UK are included into our sample, armed 
conflict has been a common phenomenon for these countries over a long-time. Moreover, in a 
126 dataset, may be these three countries could not play any significant role to alter the overall 
results. The R-square and F-statistic values and number of observations are also presented in 
Table 3 which indicates overall fitness of the empirical models.  
4.2 Panel Study 
Unit root tests are carried out on the variables in order to determine their level of integration. 
Panel unit root tests of Levin-Lin-Chu were used and the results are reported in Table 4. The 
results indicate that all the variables are stationary, I(0) on level. Consequently, model in 
equation (3) is estimated in panel using the pooled OLS and the fixed effects estimators. 
Estimated results are given in Table 5 and Table 6, respectively.   
<Table 5> 
<Table 6> 
The results from the pooled OLS show that overall, all traditional variables - first lag of GDP, 
labour, capital and human capital are positive and significant contributors to GDP growth in 
both empirical models (real GDP per capita and real GDP). Sunspot variable, corruption plays 
a negative and significant role in economic growth. In full-sample, the size of coefficient of 
NPI is the highest among all variables in both models (GDP per capita and GDP). This is 
consistent with the results reported from cross-section approach.  
The polity variable is found to be negative and significant in high- and low-income countries12. 
Overall, the effect of polity on growth is insignificant. It also found insignificant in middle 
income countries. This is not surprising as Bhutan (-10), Qatar (-10), Saudi Arabia (-10), 
Turkmenistan (-9), Uzbekistan (-9), Swaziland (-9), UAE (-8), China (-7), Vietnam (-7), Laos 
(-7) have very low polity scores. However, their average growth for the sample period is 
generally high; Bhutan (8.5%), Qatar (12.5%), Saudi Arabia (3.4%), Turkmenistan (14.2%), 
Uzbekistan (6.5%), Swaziland (3.1%), UAE (5.8%), China (10.3%), Vietnam (7.3%), Laos 
(6.8%) indicate that polity score does not positively affect economic growth. In reality, the 
                                                          
12 There are 32 countries in the high-income group and 17 countries in low-income group and middle-income 
countries group consists of 57 countries. 
15 
 
average growth rate of these countries for the sample period is 7.8%, which is a way higher 
than the world growth rate average of 4.5%.   
The results also indicate that armed conflict has a negative impact on GDP growth in low 
income countries. It is insignificant in the full-sample estimation as well as in the sub-sample 
of middle-income countries. The results are similar for high-income countries estimates that 
used GDP per capita as a dependent variable. Unexpectedly, conflict is found to have positive 
effect to GDP for the high-income countries. However, before we make a comment on this 
issue, we need to double check the effect of conflict on high income countries economic 
growth.  
Results from the fixed effects as reported in Table 6, which indicates that lag of GDP, labour, 
capital and human capital are positive and significant determinants of economic growth. The 
first lag of GDP can be termed as initial endowment for current year’s GDP growth. Human 
capital (HK) is found negative and significant for low income countries. We, then, have tested 
the effect of its (HK) lags on economic growth. The study finds that a one-year lag of human 
capital has an insignificant effect (-.018(.015)) on economic growth, however, two-year lag has 
appeared to be positive and significant (0.023***(0.011)) in our growth regression. This 
indicates that if low income countries invest in human capital, it becomes an investment (cost) 
for current year, however, this investment starts giving returns from year two. 
Institutional determinants such as corruption are found to be negative and significant in full-
sample and in most of the sub-samples. Overall, polity and armed conflicts are found to be 
insignificant variables in the fixed effects models. Armed conflict is not found positive in high 
income countries data when we have applied the fixed effects estimator (see, Table 6). Number 
of observations in cross-section and panel are 126 and 1057 respectively.  
4.3 Important Differences across the Income Groups 
Labour force is significant at all conventional levels for the model that uses the real GDP for 
all the groups. However, it has the lowest coefficient for the low-income countries. The 
coefficient for the labour force in the non-oil producing countries is the highest as reported in 
Table 3. This may be a reflection of non-existence of ‘resource curse’ as suggested by the 
literature on the natural resources abundance that such resources tend to have negative effect 
on other sectors of the countries’ economies. This is particularly, on their labour productivity. 
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Similar pattern of results has been reported in Table 5 based on pooled OLS. The only 
difference is that the model that uses the real GDP per capita reports higher value of coefficient 
than the one that uses the real GDP. Capital is significant at any conventional level for all the 
groups, except the middle-income countries where it is insignificant. Results for the former are 
consistent with general findings of the literature on growth. However, insignificance of capital 
to middle-income countries could be attributed to trade union activities, which may undermine 
productivity of capital. Human capital is insignificant in the high-income group, but is highly 
significant and positive in both middle- and low-income countries. The role of democracy to 
economic performance appears to be negative and significant to high- and low-income 
countries, but positive and insignificant in the middle-income countries. The former is 
consistent with the literature (see, for example, Chan (2002), Dornbusch and Edwards (1991), 
Kohli (2004), Leftwitch (2005) among others) that argues that democratic countries find it 
difficult to implement painful economic programmes that are beneficial to economic growth. 
Sometimes, even if these programmes are necessary. This is more evident in the current 
experience, particularly, of the Euro-Zone countries in implementing reforms after the 
sovereign debt crisis. This is in contrast to what was later known as the “Chilean miracles”, 
which referred to economic results obtained as a consequent of reforms imposed by the former 
dictator, Pinochet. Secondly, most of the best performing economies in the world are non-
democratic ones. For example, in its 2015 annual report, the World Economic Forum declares 
Qatar, an autocratic country, as the most efficient economy in the world and followed by 
Singapore. The results for the middle-income group suggest that for democracy to be beneficial 
to economic growth, a country must achieve a certain threshold of income that is sufficient 
enough to strengthen democratic institutions, but not too strong to hinder overall economic 
performance.  
It is also noteworthy that the results reported in Table 5 indicate that the role of corruption to 
economic growth differs across the groups. It is found to hamper growth in high- and middle-
income group countries. However, its role in low-income countries is insignificant. The former 
is consistent with literature on corruption that suggests that it is ‘sand in the wheel’ while the 
latter is in consonant with those who argue that corruption could act as ‘grease in the wheel of 
the economy as it can promote productive activities. It is argued that without corruption such 
businesses would not have developed. But what the results indicate that level of national 
income important in these different roles of corruption.   
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5. Conclusion 
This paper investigates the effects of the institutional variables on economic growth. It is 
motivated by an augmented Cobb-Douglas production function. We use ten years (2000-2009) 
mean values of variables and construct cross-section dataset for 126 countries. Subsequently, 
we estimate growth model by using both full-sample and sub-samples data. The countries are 
classified into high-, middle- and low-income using the World Bank criteria. The study used 
panel of 106 countries with 1060 observations. Similar to cross-sectional study, we use both 
full-sample and sub-samples to estimate economic growth models using Pooled OLS and the 
fixed effects approach.   
The results from both cross-section and panel data analysis indicate that traditional variables, 
which are first lag of GDP (only in panel), labour, physical capital and human capital are found 
to be significant determinants of economic growth. These variables foster economic growth. 
On the contrary, corruption plays a significant negative role in fostering economic growth. The 
size effect of corruption is the maximum among all the traditional and institutional variables. 
It can be documented that most of the contributions of the traditional variables to economic 
growth are neutralised by corruption alone. The coefficient of polity (democracy) variable in 
most of the cases is insignificant which indicates that polity cannot influence economic growth. 
However, in few cases we found that polity plays a negative role in economic growth. One 
generally does not expect a negative effect of polity. However, this result is in line with the 
existing empirical literature (see, Bruneti, 1997). Armed conflicts do not appear to have any 
statistically significant effect on economic growth except in low-income countries.      
The results also demonstrate that influence of some certain institutional variables vary 
according to the income level of the countries. For example, corruption is found to have 
significant negative effects in high- and middle-income countries. However, it is found to be 
positive, although insignificant in low-income countries. This difference, therefore, sheds light 
on the argument that corruption could be favourable to growth. The results show that corruption 
could only have positive impact in poor countries with weak institutions where absence of 
corruption could be a barrier to investments that businesses may find not profitable. Similarly, 
democracy is found to be negative in high- and low-income countries, but positive in middle-
income countries. This shows that for democracy to be beneficial to growth, income level of 
the country should be between low and high thresholds. The critical question that is a future 
research is to determine what these thresholds are.    
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In conclusion, our estimated results (in general) indicate that lag income, labour, physical 
capital and human capital are positive and statistically significant determinants of economic on 
growth. However, institutional variables, particularly, corruption has a significant negative 
effect on economic growth. Others have ambiguous effect on economic growth. Armed conflict 
and polity are either statistically insignificant determinants or negative determinants of 
economic growth. The empirical results of this study are consistent with theoretical forecasting 
of the paper as well as with existing literature.    
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Figure 1a  
Polity and Real GDP (PPP) 
 
Figure 2b 
Polity and Real GDP per Capita 
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The vertical axis shows both logarithm of real GDP (PPP) per capita and logarithm of real GDP (PPP) against average 
Polity for full sample. The mean lines of GDP and polity are also shown to indicate which country is above the mean 
and which country is below it. Country codes are used following World Bank coding for countries. We calculated 10 
years’ average value (2000-2009) for GDP and polity score of each country. We draw the trend line which shows an 
upward trend in case of real GDP (PPP) as well as real GDP (PPP) per capita.  
 
Figure 2a  
Non-corruption Indicator and Real GDP (PPP) 
 
Figure 2b 
Non-corruption Indicator and Real GDP (PPP) Per Capita 
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Figure 3:  
Real GDP per capita of Countries Encaged in Conflicts 
 
Figure 3b 
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Real GDP of Countries Encaged in Conflicts 
 
Data Source: UCDP Battle-related death estimates (Version 5.0). Note: Countries which were directly 
involved in armed conflict was counted as conflicting country. Those countries which supported a third 
country or group however were not directly involved in combat and those countries which were not 
involved in any combat, were included in Non-conflicting country.   
 
 
Table 1 
Descriptive Statistics (2000-2009) – Cross-sectional Data 
Sample Mean S.D. Min Max 
 
Full-sample (N =126) 
GDP (PPP) Per Capita   10727.04 11866.61 275.24 46432.2 
GDP (PPP) (million) 418000 1310000 1270 12300000 
Growth Rate 4.41 2.26 .58 14.91 
Labour Force (million) 21.60 78.70 0.25 758 
Capital 21.62 5.40 8.86 51.87 
Human Capital 21.68 15.70 0.67 74.10 
Polity 14.10 5.89 1 20 
Corruption 3.99 2.07 1.70 9.52 
Conflict (Battle Death) 308.34 994.54 0 8202 
     
High income countries (N=38) 
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GDP (PPP) Per Capita 26563.36 10325.79 10181.49 46432.2 
GDP (PPP) (million) 919000 2140000 19400 12300000 
Growth Rate 3.24 1.74 0.58 7.01 
Labour Force (million) 15.60 29.60 0.38 154 
Capital 21.55 3.73 12.29 29.05 
Human Capital 31.48 12.35 11.17 57.53 
Polity 17.29 5.77 1 20 
Corruption 6.53 2.0 2.38 9.52 
Conflict (Battle Death) 294.25 1377.35 0 8202 
 
Middle income countries (N =60) 
GDP (PPP) Per Capita 5965.87 3588.98 1234.84 15999.29 
GDP (PPP) (million) 315000 837000 1930 5770000 
Growth Rate 4.59 2.24 0.71 14.91 
Labour Force(million) 31.60 111.00 0.30 758.00 
Capital 21.79 4.72 10.42 39.48 
Human Capital 23.55 15.39 0.67 74.10 
Polity 13.69 5.69 1 20 
Corruption 3.17 0.92 2.04 5.84 
Conflict (Battle Death) 194.70 604.03 0 3298.36 
 
Least Developed Countries (N=30) 
GDP(PPP) Per Capita 1245.8 928.28 275.24 4729.59 
GDP (PPP) (million) 21200 31900 1270 168000 
Growth Rate 5.48 2.29 1.12 10.66 
Labour Force (million) 8.77 12.80 0.25 64.40 
Capital 21.36 7.97 8.86 51.86 
Human Capital 6.16 4.53 0.97 17.50 
Polity 11.09 4.57 3 17.64 
Corruption 2.59 0.69 1.70 5.38 
Conflict (BD) 552.53 1069.05 0 4650 
Note: Human capital is proxied by labour force with secondary education (% of population aged 25 and over); 
Polity is polity score; corruption is non-corruption score and conflict is the number of battle death. We have used 
World Bank (2009) information which has classified countries as per their Gross National Income Per capita (in 
dollar value). There are countries which moved from one group to another group due to the change in their income 
level. We have used average (2000-2009) income level. Hence, for example, there are some countries which are 
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shown in the middle income group; however, the average income level of those countries is higher than the lowest 
income level in high income group.     
 
Table 2  
Correlation Matrix (Panel Data) 
 ln(YPC) ln(Y) ln(LF) ln(K) ln(HK) ln(P) ln(NPI) 
ln(YPC) 1.00       
ln(Y) 0.66    1.00      
ln(LF) 0.05    0.78   1.00     
ln(K) 0.25    0.18    0.03 1.00    
ln(HK) 0.61    0.32     -0.09 0.21 1.00   
ln(P) 0.29    0.23    0.07   -0.02    0.23 1.00  
ln(NPI) 0.80    0.46   -0.04    0.18    0.42    0.30 1.00 
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Table 3 
Cross-sectional regressions using mean values (2000-09) of variables 
Variables GDP (PPP) per capita GDP (PPP) 
Full-Sample High-
Income 
Middle-
Income 
Low- 
Income 
Non-Oil Full-Sample High-
Income 
Middle-
Income 
Low-
Income 
Non-Oil 
C 3.486*** 
(.959) 
6.930*** 
(1.270) 
5.881*** 
(1.295) 
5.659*** 
(1.374) 
3.518*** 
(1.031) 
4.88*** 
(.960) 
8.460*** 
(1.186) 
7.862*** 
(1.284) 
6.542*** 
(1.603) 
4.907*** 
(1.063) 
lnL .116** 
(.044) 
.073* 
(.042) 
.056 
(.054) 
.078 
(.079) 
.100** 
(.048) 
1.103*** 
(.044) 
1.076*** 
(.039) 
1.043*** 
(.054) 
.879*** 
(.092) 
1.088*** 
(.050) 
lnK .112 
(.248) 
.393 
(.347) 
.062 
(.360) 
.923*** 
(.268) 
.129 
(.255) 
.067 
(.248) 
.115 
(.324) 
.184 
(.357) 
1.139*** 
(.313) 
.065 
(.263) 
lnHK .446*** 
(.068) 
.017 
(.121) 
.144 
(.091) 
.074 
(.098) 
.415*** 
(.070) 
.417*** 
(.068) 
.023 
(.112) 
.100 
(.090) 
.099 
(.114) 
.385*** 
(.072) 
lnP -.170* 
(.098) 
-.307*** 
(.092) 
-.036 
(.116) 
-.195 
(.167) 
-.078 
(.108) 
-.194* 
(.098) 
-.252*** 
(.085) 
-.113 
(.116) 
-.173 
(.194) 
-.125 
(.111) 
lnNPI 1.770*** 
(.158) 
.877*** 
(.164) 
1.145*** 
(.291) 
.0001 
(.450) 
1.650*** 
(.239) 
1.685*** 
(.158) 
.778*** 
(.153) 
1.285*** 
(.289) 
.185 
(.525) 
1.678*** 
(.247) 
Conflict -.289* 
(.152) 
.105 
(.199) 
-.159 
(.188) 
-.053 
(.169) 
-.254 
(.163) 
-.245 
(.153) 
.039 
(.185) 
-.131 
(.187) 
.172 
(.198) 
-.209 
(.168) 
Adj. R2 0.74 0.56 0.32 0.51 0.63 0.88 0.97 0.89 0.85 0.86 
FSTAT 58.99*** 6.17*** 4.14*** 6.07*** 27.09*** 154.35*** 175.12*** 85.47*** 29.39*** 91.90*** 
Countries 126 36 60 30 93 126 36 60 30 93 
Note: ***p<0.01; **p<0.05 and *p<0.10; standard errors are in parentheses.  
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Table 4 
Unit root tests (Levin-Lin-Chu test) 
Series Level 1st Difference 
Intercept Intercept & Trend Intercept Intercept & Trend 
ln(YPC) -5.54** -3.36** -5.14** -7.22** 
ln(Y) -3.97** -5.15** -5.33** -6.51** 
ln(LF) 0.95 -28.08** -17.78** -23.76** 
ln(K) -8.06** -8.01** -14.87** -20.84** 
ln(HK) -2.36** -4.75** -13.35** -23.35** 
ln(P) -14.00** -11.82** -11.29** -16.75** 
ln(NPI) -14.30** -20.95** -25.15** -26.52** 
**p<0.01; *p<0.05. Null hypothesis: unit root 
 
Table 5  
Regression Results (Pooled OLS) 
Variable GDP (PPP) Per Capita GDP (PPP) 
Full-
Sample 
High-
Income 
Middle- 
Income 
Low- 
Income  
Full-
Sample 
High-
Income 
Middle- 
Income 
Low -
Income  
C .619*** 
(.214) 
1.887**
* 
(.373) 
.655*** 
(.258) 
1.523**
* 
(.354) 
1.819**
* 
(.273) 
6.147**
* 
(.426) 
4.403**
* 
(.395) 
4.741**
* 
(.539) 
lnY.L1 .605*** 
(.016) 
.645*** 
(.033) 
.812*** 
(.022) 
.758*** 
(.036) 
.367*** 
(.016) 
.118*** 
(.020) 
.336*** 
(.022) 
.332*** 
(.038) 
lnL .039*** 
(.009) 
.042*** 
(.008) 
.018** 
(.008) 
.028 
(.018) 
.721*** 
(.019) 
.988*** 
(.023) 
.733*** 
(.025) 
.667*** 
(.041) 
lnK .216*** 
(.048) 
.186*** 
(.063) 
.042 
(.052) 
.269*** 
(.046) 
.223*** 
(.059) 
.212*** 
(.083) 
.166 
(.182) 
.290*** 
(.073) 
lnHK .197*** 
(.015) 
.028 
(.020) 
.058*** 
(.018) 
.040** 
(.015) 
.270*** 
(.018) 
.087*** 
(.026) 
.110*** 
(.026) 
.061** 
(.024) 
lnP .019 
(.023) 
-
.146*** 
(.027) 
.017 
(.020) 
-.088** 
(.039) 
.004 
(.028) 
-.256*** 
(.033) 
.016 
(.031) 
-
.190*** 
(.061) 
lnNPI .740*** 
(.041) 
.425*** 
(.043) 
.268*** 
(.053) 
-.022 
(.069) 
1.058**
* 
(.045) 
.808*** 
(.044) 
.763*** 
(.079) 
-.055 
(.108) 
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Conflict -.043 
(.029) 
.047 
(.058) 
-.067 
(.086) 
-
.134*** 
(.039) 
-.017 
(.035) 
.277*** 
(.076) 
-.008 
(.048) 
-
.276*** 
(.060) 
Adj. R2 0.89 0.83 0.79 0.82 0.93 0.97 0.91 0.92 
FSTAT 1197.95
*** 
224.27*
** 
306.02*
** 
111.00*
** 
1989.34
*** 
1701.34
*** 
1001.56
*** 
291.03*
** 
Observat
ion 
1058 317 568 169 1058 317 568 169 
Countrie
s 
106 32 57 17 106 32 57 17 
Note: ***p<0.01; **p<0.05 and *p<0.10; standard errors are in parentheses.  
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Table 6 
Regression Results (Fixed Effects) 
Variable GDP (PPP) Per Capita GDP (PPP) 
Full-Sample High-Income Middle- 
Income 
Low-Income  Full-Sample High-Income Middle- 
Income 
Low-Income  
C -.197 
(.667) 
7.387*** 
(1.498) 
-4.584*** 
(.915) 
-10.378*** 
(1.655) 
4.705*** 
(.658) 
12.237*** 
(1.368) 
1.548*** 
(.955) 
5.695*** 
(.730) 
lnY.L1 .036*** 
(.005) 
.075*** 
(.023) 
.047*** 
(.010) 
.123*** 
(.025) 
.015*** 
(.003) 
.006 
(.007) 
.010** 
(.004) 
.050*** 
(.017) 
lnL .458*** 
(.046) 
.013 
(.069) 
.714*** 
(.063) 
1.054*** 
(.116) 
1.197*** 
(.045) 
.809*** 
(.063) 
1.386*** 
(.065) 
2.029*** 
(.111) 
lnK .197*** 
(.018) 
.300*** 
(.054) 
.313*** 
(.024) 
.038 
(.028) 
.194*** 
(.017) 
.285*** 
(.050) 
.318*** 
(.024) 
.088*** 
(.033) 
lnHK .265*** 
(.034) 
.373*** 
(.080) 
.196*** 
(.041) 
-.138* 
(.074)a 
.246*** 
(.034) 
.331*** 
(.072) 
.198*** 
(.042) 
-.159  
(.072) 
lnP -.020 
(.019) 
-.405 
(.369) 
-.052** 
(.025) 
.011 
(.023) 
-.021 
(.019) 
-.429 
(.336) 
-.064** 
(.025) 
-.008 
(.034) 
lnNPI .073*** 
(.025) 
.403*** 
(.077) 
.050 
(.034) 
.098* 
(.050) 
.072*** 
(.024) 
.353*** 
(.071) 
.049 
(.036) 
.069* 
(.037) 
Conflict -.044 
(.036) 
-.040 
(.091) 
-.047 
(.034) 
-.015 
(.020) 
-.026 
(.035) 
-.036 
(.082) 
-.035 
(.036) 
-.002 
(.020) 
Overall R2 0.15 0.30 0.12 0.12 0.71 0.93 0.86 0.81 
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FSTAT 99.61*** 18.29*** 106.40*** 28.80*** 272.29*** 48.88*** 196.32*** 111.40*** 
Observation 1057 317 568 168a 1057 317 568 169 
Countries 106 32 57 17 106 32 57 17 
Note: ***p<0.01; **p<0.05 and *p<0.10; standard errors are in parentheses. aThis is the effect of current human capital on current economic growth. 
However, one-year lag shows an insignificant effect (-.018(.015)) and two-year lag has appeared to be positive and significant (0.023***( 0.011)) in our growth 
regression.  
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APPENDIX 
A1. Countries in Cross-section 
Afghanistan Greece Oman 
Albania Guatemala Pakistan 
Algeria Guyana Panama 
Argentina Honduras Papua New Guinea 
Armenia Hungary Paraguay 
Azerbaijan India Peru 
Australia Indonesia Philippines 
Bahrain Iran Poland 
Bangladesh Ireland Portugal 
Benin Israel Romania 
Bhutan Italy Rwanda 
Bolivia Jamaica Russia 
Botswana Japan Senegal 
Brazil Jordan Sierra Leone 
Burundi Kazakhstan Singapore 
Cambodia Kenya Slovak Republic 
Cameroon Kuwait Slovenia 
Central African Republic Kyrgyz Republic South Africa 
Chad Laos South Korea 
Chile Latvia Spain 
China Liberia Sri Lanka 
Colombia Lesotho Sudan 
Costa Rica Libya Swaziland 
Cote d’Ivoire Lithuania Sweden 
DR Congo (Zaire) Madagascar Switzerland 
Congo Malawi Syria 
Croatia Malaysia Tajikistan 
Denmark Mali Tanzania 
Dominican Republic Mauritania Togo 
Egypt Mauritius Thailand 
El Salvador Mexico Trinidad and Tobago 
Ecuador Moldova Turkey 
Estonia Mongolia Tunisia 
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Ethiopia Morocco Uganda 
Fiji Mozambique Ukraine 
Finland Namibia UAE 
France Nepal UK 
Gabon Netherlands USA 
Gambia New Zealand Uruguay 
Georgia Nicaragua Venezuela 
Germany Niger Yemen 
Ghana Norway Zambia 
Total: 126 countries 
 
 
 
 
A2 Countries in Panel 
Albania Guyana Paraguay 
Algeria Honduras Peru 
Argentina Hungary Philippines 
Armenia India Poland 
Australia Indonesia Portugal 
Bangladesh Ireland Romania 
Benin Israel Russia 
Bolivia Italy Rwanda 
Botswana Japan Senegal 
Brazil Jordan Sierra Leone 
Burundi Kazakhstan Singapore 
Cambodia Kenya Slovenia 
Cameroon Kyrgyz Republic South Africa 
Central African Republic Laos South Korea 
Chile Latvia Spain 
China Lesotho Sri Lanka 
Colombia Lithuania Sudan 
Costa Rica Malawi Swaziland 
Cote d’Ivoire Malaysia Sweden 
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DR Congo (Zaire) Mauritania Switzerland 
Congo Mauritius Syria 
Croatia Mexico Tajikistan 
Denmark Moldova Tanzania 
Dominican Republic Mongolia Thailand 
Egypt Morocco Turkey 
El Salvador Mozambique Tunisia 
Ecuador Namibia Uganda 
Estonia Nepal Ukraine 
Finland Netherlands United Arab Emirate  
France New Zealand United Kingdom 
Gabon Nicaragua Uruguay 
Gambia Niger  United States of America 
Germany Norway Venezuela 
Ghana Pakistan  Zambia 
Greece Panama  
Guatemala Papua New Guinea  
Total: 106 Countries 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
